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Abstract
This article re-evaluates earlier work done by the authors on Regional
Security Complex Theory (RSCT) in North America, using sectoral
analysis initially developed by Buzan and Waever, but also adding the
variables of institutions, identity, and interests. These variables are
assessed qualitatively in the contemporary context on how they currently
impress upon the process of securitization within sectoral relations
between Canada, Mexico, and the United States. The article reviews the
movement from bilateral security relations between these states to the
development of a trilateral response to regional security challenges post-
9/11. It further addresses the present period and what appears to be a
security process derailed by recent political changes and security
inequalities, heightened by the election of Donald Trump in 2016. The
article argues that while these three states initially evinced a
convergence of regional security interests after 9/11, which did create
new institutional responses, under the current conditions, divergence in
political interests and security inequalities have reduced the explanatory
power of RSCT in North America. Relations between states in North
American are becoming less characterized by the role of institutions and
interests and more by identity politics in the region.
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1 
Introduction 
The topic of security inequalities in international relations has been an 
ongoing discussion within academic communities for many years although 
the nature of those inequalities has changed.1 During the Cold War, the focus 
was on military power as the primary variable in assessing state power, as the 
two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, sought to achieve a 
comparative advantage in military capabilities over another.2 The formation 
of security blocs, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and 
the Warsaw Pact are evidence of the focus on military power. These military 
coalitions formed to address perceived security inequalities on each side, such 
as NATO’s comparative advantage in military technological capability 
compared to the Warsaw Pact’s size in number of personnel and weapons 
systems. Realists such as George Kenan and Hans Morgenthau used the terms 
containment and balance of power as the policy means by which states 
achieved security during the Cold War, despite the security inequalities 
between states.3 
 
With the end of the Cold War and the emergence of the New World Order 
there was less emphasis placed on military power in addressing security 
inequalities between states and more of a focus on economic power and 
globalization, as the policy means by which states would achieve security.4 An 
anecdotal example of this occurred in 1995, when then US Secretary of 
Defense William Perry convened the first Defense Ministerial of the Americas 
in Williamsburg, Virginia. In his effort to gain participation by the states in 
the Western Hemisphere, then Prime Minister Denzel Douglas of St. Kitts and 
Nevis, asked if they would be discussing bananas. If not, he would not send 
                                                          
1Fathali Moghaddam, The New Global Insecurity: How Terrorism, Environmental 
Collapse, Economic Inequalities, and Resource Shortages Are Changing Our World 
(New York: Praeger Security International, 2010); Mohammed Ayoob, “Inequality and 
Theorizing in International Relations: The Case for Subaltern Realism,” International 
Studies Review 4, no. 3 (December 2002): 27-48, available at: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1521-9488.00263.  
2 Economic security was also a major variable. See Robert A. Pollard, Economic Security 
and the Origins of the Cold War, 1945-1950 (New York: Columbia Press 1985). 
3George Kenan, “The Sources of Soviet Power,” Foreign Affairs 25 no. 4 (July 1947); 
Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 1st ed. 
(New York: Alfred Knopf, 1948). 
4 Andrew HurrellandNgaire Woods. Inequality, Globalization, and World Politics 
(London,: Oxford University Press, 1999). For a more general discussion of complex 
interdependency see Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, Power and Interdependence, 4th 
ed. (New York: Longman, 2011). 
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his Defense Minister, since economic security was the most important 
concern of this small Caribbean country.5 
 
While policy makers struggled to define mutual security concerns in the post-
Cold War era, international relations scholars also sought new theoretical 
understanding of security relationships between states. This meant moving 
beyond the systemic and state-levels of analysis which dominated much of 
international relations theory in the past, to discover new approaches and 
variables to explain state behavior and the new global security dynamic. One 
such school of thought which emerged was that of constructivism, 
championed by John Ruggie and Alexander Wendt,6 which sought to move 
beyond realist explanations of state behavior based on traditional elements of 
national power, introducing new variables, such as culture and social 
understanding.7 
 
While the international relations academic community sought new 
explanatory theories related to state behavior and security inequalities 
between states in a post-Cold War era, conflict did not go away. Threats, 
which had once been shaped primarily by superpower conflict and the fear of 
global nuclear war become more regional and local, with the advent of failed 
states and intra-state and regional conflict.8 Conflicts such as Somalia (1993), 
Bosnia (1995), and Kosovo (1999) reflected the changing dynamics of the 
fragmentation of state power and military confrontation between rival ethnic 
                                                          
5 Personal observations of one of the authors, having attended the DMA in Williamsburg, 
VA in 1995. 
6John Ruggie, “What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-Utilitarianism and the Social 
Constructivist Challenge.” International Organization 52, no.4a (1998): 855-885; 
Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Relations (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999). 
7 These are commonly referred to by the acronym DIME (Diplomacy, Information, 
Military, and Economic). Alastair Ian Johnson, “Thinking about Culture,” International 
Security 19, no. 4 (1995): 32-64, available at: http://www.fb03.uni-
frankfurt.de/45431264/Johnston-1995-Thinking-aboutStrategic-Culture.pdf; Peter 
Katzenstein, ed. Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996); Michael Desch, “Culture Clash: Assessing the 
Importance of Ideas in Security Studies,” International Security 23, vol. 1 (1998): 141-170, 
available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/isec.23.1.141. Roy Koslowski and Freidrich 
Kratochwil, “Understanding Change in International Politics: The Soviet Empire’s 
Demise and the International System,” International Organization 48, no. 2 (1994): 215-
47, available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300028174; Vendulka Kubalkova, 
Nicholas Onuf and Paul Kowert, eds, International Relations in a Constructed World 
(London: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1998). 
8Richard Kilroy, Abelardo Rodriguez, and Todd Hataley, North American Regional 
Security: A Trilateral Framework? (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2012) 
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factions for political power and territory defined what was quickly becoming a 
New World Disorder.  
 
Post 9/11 Security in North America 
When the terrorist attacks occurred in the United States on September 11, 
2001 (9/11), challenges of asymmetrical threats, such as terrorism and 
transnational criminal activity, confronted the field of international security 
studies once again. Even though these threats had existed for some time, they 
took on new significance as non-state actors operationalized traditional 
means of attacks (airline hijackings and suicide attacks) in ways that had a 
strategic effect, thus shocking the world. As a result, regional approaches 
toward security relationships between states and against non-state actors 
took on new significance, as states placed a greater emphasis on homeland 
security and the tightening up of their respective boundaries. Old security 
concepts such as perimeter defense took on new meaning in a post 9/11 world 
with states, such as the United States and Russia, seeking to expand their 
respective defenses by pushing security out to neighboring countries (the near 
abroad in Russia’s case or North America for the United States), seeking 
regional cooperation and support against new threats.9 
 
Regionalization of security concerns, which emerged after 9/11, appeared to 
give support to what Buzan and Waever called Regional Security Complex 
Theory (RSCT).10 The application of their sectoral analysis in the context of 
North American security integration appeared particularly prescient given the 
geopolitical changes of the contemporary security environment and the new 
threats posed to state security after 9/11.11 All three countries, Canada, United 
States and Mexico developed new institutions across sectors (political, 
economic, military, social, and environmental), which supported 
securitization. The political leaders embraced shared interests in confronting 
threats by proposing programs and policies, such as the Security and 
Prosperity Partnership (SPP). 
 
 
 
                                                          
9Richard Kilroy, “Perimeter Defense and Regional Security Cooperation in North 
America: United States, Canada, and Mexico,” Homeland Security Affairs Journal, 
(December 2007), available at: https://www.hsaj.org/articles/138. 
10Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International 
Security (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
11Kilroy, et al., North American Regional Security. 
Kilroy et al.: Security Inequalities in North America
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2017
4 
Thesis Statement and Argument 
Today, however, there appears to be retrenchment of nationalism and the rise 
of identity politics emerging in North America, most evident with the election 
of Donald Trump as president of the United States in 2016. The campaign 
rhetoric, which focused on immigration as the main security threat to the 
United States, building a wall between the United States and Mexico, and 
ending the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), is now part of 
the public policy discourse in Washington, threatening to create new fissures 
between countries within the region. What developed after 9/11 as an 
emerging trilateral response to regional security challenges, providing 
empirical support for RSCT, appears significantly impacted by security 
inequalities between states and identity politics.  
 
This article reevaluates RSCT in North America, looking at the sectoral 
analysis provided by Buzan and Waever, but also adding the variables of 
institutions, identity, and interests. These variables, assessed qualitatively in 
the contemporary context, reflect how they currently affect the process of 
securitization in sectoral relations between Canada, Mexico, and the United 
States. The article reviews the movement from bilateral security relations 
between these states to the development of a trilateral response to regional 
security challenges post- 9/11. It further addresses the present period and 
what appears to be a security process derailed by recent political changes and 
security inequalities, heightened by the election of Donald Trump in 2016. 
The article argues that while these three states initially evinced a convergence 
of regional security interests after 9/11, which did create new institutional 
responses, under the current conditions, divergence in political interests and 
security inequalities have reduced the explanatory power of RSCT in North 
America. Relations between states in North American appear less 
characterized by the role of institutions and interests and more by identity 
politics in the region.  
 
Regional Security Complex Theory Explained 
Buzan and Waever define a regional security complex as “a set of units whose 
major processes of securitization, desecuritization, or both are so interlinked 
that their security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart 
from one another.”12 In an earlier work, Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde 
proposed an approach to security analysis that broke down the whole into five 
sectors used for security analysis: the military sector, the environmental 
                                                          
12Buzan and Waever, Regions and Power, 44. 
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sector, the economic sector, the societal sector, and the political sector.13 By 
using the term securitization, Buzan et al., effectively argued that security was 
too broad a concept defined purely in military terms alone: it is best viewed 
across multiple sectors of both the state and society, where the state alone 
does not hold a monopoly of either power or influence on security. Yet, 
securitization, as used by Buzan et al., has its critics, who argue that by 
broadening the definition of security, they have in fact weakened it, to the 
point that anything can be securitized and thus impact state security.14 What 
then is neglected is what states actually do to operationalize security. 
 
Yet, Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde argue that their views on securitization 
involve three steps, which prevent everything from becoming a security issue: 
identification of existential threats emergency action and effects on inter-unit 
relations by breaking free of rules.15 The problem, however, is that not all 
threats are existential to all states, and therefore states perceive of threats 
differently, requiring different sets of emergency action and different 
responses from both public and private sectors. Thus, the sectoral analysis 
offered by Buzan, Waever and de Wilde do provide a means by which 
securitization can be disaggregated from the whole to examine specific areas 
of concern where cooperation or conflict (amity or enmity) can occur between 
states. In developing RSCT in their later work, Buzan and Waever make the 
argument that it is in fact these inter-unit relations between states that are 
most applicable regionally and by examining each sector, a larger picture 
occurs of what regional security cooperation takes place across borders (or 
not: thus, desecuritization may occur). 
 
Other Views on Regional Security Relationships 
Buzan and Waever may have developed RSCT, but they are not alone in 
seeking a theoretical understanding of regional interaction between states 
regarding security. David Lake and Patrick Morgan suggest security is simply 
one important variable that drives the development of regional orders, but 
certainly not the only one.16 Their idea of regional orders approximates Buzan 
                                                          
13Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for 
Analysis. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1998), p. 8. 
14Amir Lupovici, “The Limits of Securitization Theory: Observational Criticism and the 
Curious Absence of Israel,” International Studies Review 16, no. 3 (September 2014): 
390-410, available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/misr.12150; Rita Taurek, “Securitization 
Theory and Securitisation Studies,” Journal of International Relations and Development 
9 (2006): 53-61, available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.jird.1800072. 
15Buzan, et al., Security: A New Framework, 6. 
16David Lake and Patrick Morgan, Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World. 
(University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997). 
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and Waever’s security complexes; however, Lake and Morgan take a much 
more inclusive view of what constitutes a region, whereas Buzan and Waever 
are much more exclusive, arguing that regions are clearly defined.17 Lake and 
Morgan also make the argument that, “Regions behave differently than the 
international system, thus new approaches and new theories are necessary to 
fully understand regional security dynamics” and “Regions provide a new 
dynamic for great powers and therefore traditional foreign policy approaches 
to regional conflicts may no longer be appropriate. Great power foreign policy 
must be designed to suit the region.”18 Thus, the idea of security inequalities 
between a powerful state (United States) and less powerful states (Canada 
and Mexico) affects the relations between these states, regionally, in North 
America.  
 
According to Buzan and Waever, North America (comprised of Canada, 
Mexico, and the United States) would fit their definition of an RSCT since it 
possesses all four of the criteria necessary: 
 
1. A boundary dividing regional neighbors. 
2. Anarchic structure of two or more autonomous units. 
3. Polarity defining the distribution of power among units. 
4. A socially constructed understanding of amity and enmity among 
the units.19 
 
In addition, the security environment and threats that emerged after 9/11, 
which had a direct impact on the United States, also affected Canada and 
Mexico, due to their shared borders. As one former Canadian military officer 
once stated, “if your neighbor’s house is on fire, you can sit and watch it burn 
and hope it doesn’t spread to your house, or you can grab a hose and help him 
put it out, which also protects your home.”20 
 
A Regional Security Complex in North America 
As a result of the events of 9/11 and the focus placed by the United States on 
homeland security, both Canada and Mexico took a number of steps across 
                                                          
17Lake and Morgan, 30; Buzan and Waever, Regions and Power, 48-50. 
18Lake and Morgan, Regional Order, 6-7. 
19Buzan and Waever, Regions and Power, 53. 
20 This comment was shared at the Kingston Conference on International Security, 
Ontario, Canada (June 11-12, 2009). Interestingly, a Mexican military officer attending 
the conference made another comment about increased security cooperation between 
Canada and Mexico. He stated that Mexico would be open to more security cooperation 
with Canada; however, there was this large thing in between their two countries (Personal 
observations of the authors who attended this event). 
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Buzan, Waever and de Wilde’s sectors (military, economic, social, 
environmental, and political) to increase security cooperation with the United 
States. Both states recognized that US insecurity influenced the much broader 
regional context for their collective relations. Most of these actions occurred 
bilaterally, rather than trilaterally, for example, Canada and the United States 
or Mexico and the United States. However, in sectors where trilateral 
relations already existed, the discourse necessarily took on a trilateral 
dimension. An example of this would be the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA), between Canada, Mexico, and the United States, which 
went into effect in 1994. Yet, NAFTA did not create institutions like those, 
which emerged in Europe with the formation of the European Union (EU) 
and a regional governance model. Rather NAFTA was a loose economic 
governance model which, after 9/11, became more securitized and more 
reflective of a ‘hierarchical sovereignty’ (as defined by Lake and Morgan), 
rather than a ‘pooled sovereignty’ model of institution building.21 
 
Sectoral Analysis 
Within the political sector, a number of institutional changes took place in 
North America. The largest restructuring of the US government since 1947 
occurred in 2002 under the Homeland Security Act, which established the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS). This new cabinet-level agency, 
which has grown to over 240,000 members, consolidated a number of federal 
agencies, which had previously been under other cabinets, such as the US 
Coast Guard, which had been part of the Department of Transportation.22 The 
Department of Homeland Security also included new agencies, such as the 
Transportation Security Administration (TSA). Canada followed suit in 2003 
by creating its own homeland security agency, Public Safety Canada (PSC).Its 
mission mirrored that of the DHS, “to ensure coordination across all federal 
departments and agencies responsible for national security and the safety of 
Canadians. Our mandate is to keep Canadians safe from a range of risks such 
as natural disasters, crime, and terrorism.”23 Mexico did not create a new 
political institution to match that of DHS or PSC. Instead, it created a Public 
Security Department (discontinued in 2013) which focused on internal 
security issues related to policing and crime. Mexico did not have a national 
                                                          
21Greg Anderson, Securitization and Sovereignty in Post-9/11 North America, Review of 
International Political Economy 19, no. 5 (2012): 1–31, available at: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09692290.2011.600239.  
22Department of Homeland Security (DHS) (2016). “About DHS,” available at: 
https://www.dhs.gov/about-dhs.  
23Public Safety Canada (PSC) “About Public Safety Canada,” (2016), available at 
http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/bt/index-en.aspx.  
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security strategy before 9/11, and did not create one immediately afterwards 
during the Fox Administration (2000-2006) which would drive changes in 
bureaucratic structures focused on security. As a result, Mexico had an 
incomplete national security law in 2005, lacking a new department, which 
could address homeland security issues. Although the Fox Administration 
inaugurated the office of National Security Advisor, this office went 
unregulated by law and had many political and bureaucratic problems in 
forming a national security cabinet, or a means by which there was a clear 
coordination between national security and foreign policy. Thus, after 9/11, 
“the Mexico government experienced a political, conceptual, and institutional 
vacuum and was unable to coordinate, plan, and administer resources of the 
state in order to cooperate effectively with the United States.”24 In the end, 
after 2005, the coordination between the United States and Mexico on North 
American security concerns took place between the Ministry of the Interior 
and the Department of Homeland Security.25 
 
Within the military sector, a similar dynamic occurred with the United States 
creating a new homeland defense command, US Northern Command 
(USNORTHCOM) in 2002, which would coordinate US military support to 
the federal government in response to threats within North America. 
USNORTHCOM became the country’s sixth regional command, responsible 
for the territorial defense of North America, to include Canada and Mexico (as 
well as the Bahamas, Puerto Rico and the US Virgin Islands), under its Area 
of Responsibility (AOR).26 Canada also stood up Canada Command in 2006, 
which had a similar homeland continental defense mission to 
USNORTHCOM. Canada and the United States were already part of military 
alliances, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), as well as 
the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD). USNORTHCOM took 
over operational responsibility of NORAD from the old US Space Command, 
with its new headquarters at Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado. Again, 
                                                          
24Kilroy, et al., North American Regional Security, 109. 
25Interview of one of the authors with the former Minister of the Interior, Santiago Creel 
Miranda, Mexico, City, August 12, 2015. Mexico produced a National Security Program 
document under the Calderon administration (2006-2012) and later under Peña Nieto 
(2012-2018). The latest is the “National Security Program 2014-2018: A 
multidimensional policy for Mexico in the 21st century,” available at: 
http://dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codigo=5342824&fecha=30/04/2014. The 
problem is that Mexico does not yet have a doctrinal conception of national security 
beyond the sexenio (6-year term) of the administration in office. 
26 “About NORTHCOM,” (n.d.), available at: http://www.northcom.mil/About-
USNORTHCOM/; The other five regional commands include: US Central Command 
(Middle East); US Southern Command (Central/South America and Caribbean); US 
Africa Command (Continental Africa); US European Command (Eurasia, to include 
Russia); and US Pacific Command (rest of Asia, China, and the western Pacific). 
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Mexico did not follow suit, initially, under the Fox administration, despite 
NORTHCOM’s efforts to involve Mexican military personnel in both NORAD 
and NORTHCOM structures. This would later change under the Calderon 
administration. Thus, using Buzan’s terms, while there was amity between the 
United States and Canadian militaries before and after 9/11, the enmity that 
existed between the United States and Mexican militaries remained after 9/11, 
although this did vary by institutions.27 
 
Within the economic sector, the NAFTA framework provided the institutional 
context by which the three countries addressed security concerns. The impact 
of 9/11, where all commercial airline traffic into and out of the United States 
was completely stopped on that day, had a spillover effect on Canada and 
Mexico as flights from overseas were diverted to airports in these countries. 
Events on 9/11 also affected commercial vehicular traffic across land borders, 
which had the effect of creating significant back-ups of finished goods, 
agricultural products, and supply parts. There were even discussions between 
government officials on how each country would respond to the threat of a 
terrorist incident at a critical border-crossing site, or the spillover effects of a 
bioterrorism incident or pandemic on each country’s health systems.28 Having 
the consultation mechanisms in place with NAFTA, as well as institutional 
structures, which facilitated trade and commerce between Canada, Mexico, 
and the United States, allowed for a discussion of new security concerns 
raised by the events of 9/11 within the economic sector with the goal to 
increase security without creating severe restrictions on trade and commerce. 
Examples of security measures in the economic sector after 9/11 included 
such program as the Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-
TPAT); Free and Secure Trade (FAST); and NEXUS.29 
 
Securitization within the environmental sector includes issues such as water 
rights, climate change, and health issues among others. The United States has 
                                                          
27 As one anecdotal example, during a presentation in Mexico City in 2009, the authors a 
Mexican Army officer confronted the authors. He was upset with USNORTHCOM’s 
patch, worn on US military uniforms, which showed the US eagle sitting on top of 
Mexico, Canada, and the United States. He also questioned that stationing of the US 1st 
Armored Division in El Paso, Texas, after its drawdown from Europe, arguing that it was 
there as an invasion force. While the Mexican Army has always been more nationalistic, 
the Mexican Navy has been more cooperative in working with its North American 
counterparts. In fact, the Mexican Navy provided a liaison officer to USNORTHCOM 
headquarters years before the Army finally sent its own liaison officer. 
28 An example was a conference held in San Antonio, Texas in November 2006, with the 
theme “Catastrophic Terrorism at the Border, Preparing for and Responding to Disasters 
in North America,” sponsored by US Northern Command which included government, 
military, and academic officials from all three countries. 
29 Kilroy, et al., North American Regional Security, 114. 
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bilateral treaties with Mexico and Canada with regard to shared waterways 
and access to water resources. The International Boundary Waters Treaty 
between the United States and Canada has been in existence since 1909, 
creating an International Joint Commission (IJC) to oversee shared water 
resources along the border.30 Similarly, the International Boundary and 
Water Commission exist to regulate binational water resources between 
Mexico and the United States, based on a treaty negotiated in 1944.31 More 
recently, concerns over the impact of climate change, particularly in the Arctic 
region caused the United States, Canada, and other Arctic countries to 
confront a changing geographic and environmental landscape due to the 
melting polar ice cap and increased access to fishing, minerals, as well as 
commercial transit in this region.32 Pandemic flu, such as the swine flu 
epidemic in 2009 and other communicable diseases such as the Zika virus in 
2016 affect countries in North America and throughout the Western 
Hemisphere. Information sharing between Mexico, the United States, and 
Canada help prevent the spread of these infectious diseases, along with the 
actions of local communities working across the border to address to address 
shortcoming in their public health infrastructure.33 
 
The societal sector incorporates identity issues, which have a security 
dimension at the sub-state level.34 Examples would include migration, 
Diasporas, and conflict between various ethnic groups or cultures. States, 
which share common borders, will always face some degree of social stress 
related to immigration policies, work and transit issues, economic and 
political interaction, and other cross-border dynamics.35 For the United 
States, Mexico, and Canada, the rise in international criminal gangs, engaging 
in drug and human trafficking, arms trafficking, and illegal trade and 
smuggling, have taken on new social implications since 9/11, due to fears of 
                                                          
30 International Joint Commission (ICJ), “Role of the IJC,” (2016), available at: 
http://www.ijc.org/en_/Role_of_the_Commission.  
31 Nicole T. Carter, Clare Ribando Seelke, and Daniel T. Shedd, U.S.-Mexico Water 
Sharing: Background and Recent Developments, Report No. R43312 (Washington, D.C.: 
Congressional Research Service January 2015): available at: 
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=762038.  
32 James Kraska and Betsy Baker, Emerging Security Issues in the Arctic,” (Center for a 
New American Security, March 2014), available at: 
https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/178414/CNAS_EmergingArcticSecurityChallenges_polic
ybrief.pdf.  
33 Kraska and Baker; One example shared at the conference was the cooperation between 
public health officials in Laredo, Texas and Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas, Mexico to 
confront pandemics which could impact their border communities. As early as 2006, 
meetings were taking place to discuss how these two cities would address their public 
health needs and ability to share resources to address such a threat. 
34Buzan, et al., Security: A New Framework, 119. 
35 Thus, the development of border studies as its own academic discipline. 
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terrorist groups taking advantage of these criminal networks, as well as 
migrant Diasporas, to gain access to their respective countries.36 Cultural and 
identity issues also affected the desire on the part of USNORTHCOM to 
expand its bilateral security relationship with Canada in NORAD to include 
Mexico in new formal security relationships, which went beyond air defense, 
to maritime and land-based military institutions. Language differences, 
intelligence-sharing agreements, and a difference in military cultures and 
organizational structures made such efforts difficult, if not impossible to 
overcome.37 
 
Yet in 2011, a new conference organized by the Mexican Navy’s Center for 
Advanced Naval Studies (War College), evinced a new sense of cooperation 
between the United States, Mexico, and Canada. The new NORTHCOM 
commander, Admiral James Winnefield, Jr. arrived in Mexico City with a 
more conciliatory tone and approach toward military-to-military cooperation 
in the context of the North American region as a whole. He went further than 
did his predecessors in advocating more structural cooperation with Mexico 
and Canada referring to shared interests along their common borders with 
the United States, particularly in dealing with common threats such as 
organized crime and natural disasters. The Mexican government and military 
officials positively received his message; however, the Mexican Army 
remained skeptical.38 Four years later, a conference organized by US Special 
Operations Command North (SOCNORTH) in Colorado Springs, Colorado, 
brought together Canadian, Mexican, and US military and civilian personnel 
to discuss trilateral cooperation amongst Special Operations Forces (SOF) to 
                                                          
36 A number of news articles in the Washington Times, International Business Journal, 
Judicial Watch, and other media raised the fears of terrorists taking advantage of the 
porous border with Mexico and Canada to enter the United States, possibly as Syrian 
refugees. See Stephan Dinan, “Agents nab Pakistanis with Terrorist Connections Crossing 
U.S. Border,” Washington Times, (December 30, 2015), available at: 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/dec/30/pakistanis-terrorist-
connections-nabbed-us-border/?page=all; However, for years, the Department of 
Homeland Security argued that such fears were overstated, and that no terrorists had 
been identified crossing the border. After the San Bernardino, CA terrorist attack in 
December 2015 where the suspects had ties to ISIS, more scrutiny has been placed on 
migration, both legal and illegal. 
37 In 2010, a conference hosted by the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, D.C. 
brought together senior military leaders from the United States, Canada, and Mexico, to 
discuss increased security cooperation between the three countries. The commander of 
US Northern Command, Air Force General Victor Renuart tried to convince his 
colleagues of the need for further integration and cooperation under USNORTHCOM’s 
leadership; however, he received a rather cool reception (Personal observation of the 
authors who organized this conference). 
38 Personal observation of one author who was responsible for organizing this conference. 
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confront the growing threat of Transnational Organized Crime (TOC) within 
North America.39 
 
The sectoral approach offered by Buzan, Weaver, and de Wilde and later 
expanded upon by Buzan and Weaver in developing RSCT, does provide a 
useful theoretical lens and typology for addressing securitization both 
internally within states and externally within regions. The addition of the 
variables of identity, institutions, and interests provides an increased 
understanding of how states within regions securitize issues differently and 
why certain sectors have more or less salience in understanding RSCT’s value 
in explaining security inequalities.40 
 
Operationalizing RSCT in North America 
After the terrorist attacks on 9/11, Canada and the United States redefined 
their security relationship, building on existing treaties and institutions. In 
December 2002, both countries formed a Bi-National Working Group (BWG) 
to explore areas of security cooperation that would extend beyond the current 
NORAD institutional structure (focused on air defense) to include both a 
maritime and terrestrial defense component. The BWG also addressed issues 
such as “enhanced intelligence and information sharing, interagency 
cooperation, better situational awareness, and border security.”41  
 
As mentioned previously in this article, despite efforts by the United States to 
reach out to Mexico and create more formal security cooperation ties between 
the two nations’ militaries, Mexico did not initially reciprocate. The Mexican 
Navy did agree to send a liaison officer to USNORTHCOM headquarters; 
however, the Mexican Army did not.42 One of the reasons for the lack of 
cooperation was the different threat perceptions at the time. For the United 
                                                          
39 William Mendel and Peter McCabe, SOF Role in Combating Transnational Organized 
Crime (McDill AFB, FL: Joint Special Operations University Press, 2016). 
40Kilroy, et al., North American Regional Security, 18. 
41 Kilroy, et al., North American Regional Security, 111; What many people do not know 
is that on 9/11, the operational commander of NORAD was Canadian General Rick 
Findley, the Battle Commander at the Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center, since the 
US NORAD Commander, Air Force General Ralph Eberhart, was at Peterson AFB 
Colorado Springs, Colorado (personal conversations of one of the authors with Bilateral 
Working Group members). 
42 There is one Mexican Army representative now. Under Calderon and Peña Nieto 
military to military cooperation has increased greatly. See CG. DEM Almirante José 
Santiago Valdés Álvarez, Secretaría de Marina-Armada de México, Jefe del Estado Mayor 
“Límites y alcances de la cooperación military en América del Norte,” in Abelardo 
Rodríguez (coordinador) Agendas Comunes y Diferencias en la seguridad de América 
del Norte, ¿de dóndevenimos?,¿dóndeestamos?y ¿a dóndequeremosir? (Centro de 
EstudiosSuperioresNavales de la Armada de México, Universidad de Guadalajara, 2012). 
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States, the threat was terrorism. For Mexico, the principal threat was 
organized crime. Thus, the United States looked to expand its security 
perimeter to prevent terrorists from attacking the homeland from without, 
while Mexico was more concerned with internal security, looking at the 
criminal threat within the country. These two divergent views on what 
constituted the main threat to each country were further exacerbated by the 
United States placing most of its emphasis on using the military to fight a 
Global War on Terrorism, rather than pursuing a criminal justice model to 
counter terrorism. Such a model would have placed more emphasis on law 
enforcement cooperation between police agencies rather than militaries.43 
 
Interestingly, Canada and Mexico did increase ties in law enforcement 
cooperation due to a shared security problem: organized crime and tourism. 
Through the efforts of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), working 
with both federal and state police forces in Mexico, both countries overcame 
an impasse in jurisdiction issues to allow for the sharing of law enforcement 
sensitive information and cooperation in criminal investigations involving 
Canadian citizens who were victims of criminal violence in Mexico.44 Mexican 
government officials also expressed interest in having RCMP assistance with 
developing a community-policing model, as well as support in their attempts 
to make the legal process in Mexico more transparent.45 
 
Security and Prosperity Partnership 
A major development in creating a trilateral security relationship in North 
America occurred in March 2005, when the leaders of Canada (Paul Martin), 
Mexico (Vicente Fox), and the United States (George W. Bush) met in Waco, 
Texas to sign an agreement called the Security and Prosperity Partnership 
(SPP). Although officially called the North American Leaders’ Summit, the 
initial meeting in Waco (primarily being pushed by George W. Bush), came to 
                                                          
43 Jason Rinehart, “Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency,” Perspectives on 
Terrorism 4, no. 5, (November 2010): 31-47, available at: 
http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/122/html. The 
Mexican military has had more of an internal security role, which it uses to augment 
police forces in responding to internal threats; whereas both the United States and 
Mexican have legal restrictions on the use of the military domestically. 
44 Jeff Sallot, “RCMP to Join Investigation, Mexico says,” The Globe and Mail, March 4, 
2006, available at: http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/rcmp-to-join-
investigation-mexico-says/article18157565/.  
45 The authors attended a meeting, which took place in Ciudad Juarez, Mexico in 2009, 
where the state attorney general from Chihuahua voiced these concerns to an RCMP 
official. Mexico was beginning to experiment with the use of oral testimony in its legal 
procedures, which would be a significant change in transparency of its jurisprudence and 
court system. 
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be called the Three Amigos summit by the press, due to the emphasis placed 
on the meeting as a gathering of friends rather than competitors.46 Canadians 
and Americans alike viewed SPP skeptically, believing it was a cover for 
ushering in a North American Union, under a shroud of secrecy.47 Ironically, 
Canadians viewed it as a loss of sovereignty to the United States, while 
American citizens viewed it as a loss of sovereignty to Mexico, and Mexico as 
well viewed it as a loss of sovereignty to both nations.48 
 
Yet, the SPP did seek to address some of the security inequalities between 
states in North America by creating a governing structure, which would allow 
all three countries to have a seat at the table to discuss issues related to the 
SPP’s main five main agenda items.  
 
1. Creation of a North American Competitiveness Council 
2. Advancing cooperation on avian and pandemic influenza 
3. North American Energy Security Initiative 
4. North American Emergency Management 
5. Smart, Secure Borders.49 
 
Both Martin and Fox recognized that Bush’s main goal for the SPP was to 
provide a unified North American security agenda focused on the threat of 
international terrorism. Canada and Mexico, while focused on the prosperity 
aspects of the SPP, realized that their economic relations with the United 
States needed to address United States insecurity since 9/11. By emphasizing 
areas of cooperation that would promote common border security issues, 
infrastructure protection (particularly in energy), and emergency response, 
the SPP did address some of the main threats to North America from 
terrorism. The working groups created to address such issues also had a 
prosperity dimension since they also addressed regulatory cooperation to 
promote economic growth and improve quality of life for citizens on both 
                                                          
46 Subsequent meetings between new leaders of each country become much more 
contentious over differences in trade policies, in particular. Bruce Cheadle, “Three 
Amigos summit not so chummy: Harper, Obama Spar Over Trilateral Trade,” Winnipeg 
Free Press, April 3, 2012), available at: 
http://www.winnipegfreepress.com/canada/three-amigos-summit-not-so-chummy-
145886435.html.  
47 Laura Carlson, Extending NAFTA’s Reach, (Petrolia, CA: Center for International 
Policy, 2007). Available at: https://www.counterpunch.org/2007/08/25/extending-
nafta-s-reach/.  
48 Security and Prosperity Partnership (SPP), “Security and Prosperity Partnership: 
Myths and Facts,” (2007). Available at: http://www.spp.gov/myths_vs_facts.asp.  
49Sourcewatch, “Security and Prosperity Partnership,” (2005), Available at: 
http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Security_and_Prosperity_Partnership_
of_North_America.  
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sides of shared borders. Thus, in the end, the SPP reflected a recognition that 
all three countries were part of a shared security complex. The securitization 
of issues across multiple sectors (political, economic, environmental, social, 
and military) needed to be addressed in some comprehensive framework, 
which did address the interests of all three states, and not the agenda of just 
one dominant state. 
 
Despite the good intentions of the SPP, there were still some identity issues, 
which proved hard to overcome. The working groups themselves were 
dissimilar with each country’s participants reflecting diverse interests and 
agendas. Some of the participants in each country’s bureaucracy also voiced 
skepticism about whether they were pursuing common interests over 
parochial ones.50 At the same time, those outside of the government voiced 
concern over the transparency of the negotiations, “criticizing the secretive 
and exclusionary nature of discussions, and the apparent privileging of 
business interests through the creation of the North America Competitiveness 
Council (NACC).”51 Supporters of the SPP even had reservations based on the 
decision-making model adopted by the SPP, arguing that  
 
“the SPP has been a failure in two important respects: its limited 
transparency has fueled conspiracy theories that hold the SPP is a plot 
to reduce national sovereignty in each country; and it has failed to 
allay public concerns, mainly in the U.S., that NAFTA has hurt U.S. 
[sic] prosperity more than it has helped–despite the ample economic 
data which provides evidence to the contrary.”52 
 
Less than six months after signing the SPP in Waco, Texas, a major hurricane 
affected the Gulf Coast of the United States in August 2005, causing 
significant loss of life and property damage primarily in Mississippi and 
Louisiana. The city of New Orleans alone suffered 1800 casualties and $110 
billion in damages.53 Critics assailed the Department of Homeland Security 
and its subordinate Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) for 
                                                          
50 Personal conversations of one of the authors with working group members involved in 
the SPP process. 
51 Kilroy, et al., North American Regional Security, 130. 
52 Christopher Sands, A Vote for Change and U.S. Strategy for North American 
Integration, (Washington, D.C.: Hudson Institute2008), available at: 
http://www.hudson.org/files/publications/PNA_NA_Policy_Brief_1_A_Vote_for_Cha
nge.pdf.  
53Hurricane Katrina Relief, “FAQs,” (2011), available at: 
http://www.hurricanekatrinarelief.com/index.html.  
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their poor response to the natural disaster.54 One of the reasons they were ill 
prepared to respond to this environmental threat, was due to the stand-up of 
DHS and the implementation of new programs, such as the National 
Response Plan and the National Incident Management system, which were 
primarily a response to the threat of terrorism following 9/11.55 The lack of 
communication and coordination of relief efforts at the local, state, and 
federal levels exposed serious flaws in the ability of the United States to 
respond to a natural disaster of the magnitude of Hurricane Katrina. 
Compounding the problem was the impact of Hurricane Rita, less than 30 
days later, which impacted almost the same Gulf states; however, this time 
the oil-refining areas of Texas bore the brunt of the damage. The result was a 
significant effect on a part of the United States, which “produced 
approximately 29 percent of all domestic oil production and 47 percent of the 
nation's 17 million barrels a day refining capacity.”56 
 
Since Emergency Management was one of the five main agenda items of the 
SPP, the United States, Canada, and Mexico were already beginning to 
coordinate efforts on how each country could contribute to a trilateral 
response to disasters in North America (albeit the initial focus was on 
terrorist-created disasters). Yet, institutional mechanisms to operationalize 
responses were beginning to be put in place between the militaries of each 
country, such that the Canadian navy even sent ships to support search and 
rescue and relief and recovery operations before the Canadian government 
authorized the mission.57 Even the Mexican Navy and Army responded by 
providing personnel and equipment to south Texas to support many of the 
displaced persons from New Orleans. Mexican President Vicente Fox stated, 
“these humanitarian missions reflect the Mexican people's feelings of 
solidarity with the US population.”58 
                                                          
54 Mike Ahlers, “Report: Criticism of FEMA's Katrina response deserved.” CNN, April 14, 
2006, available at: http://www.cnn.com/2006/POLITICS/04/14/fema.ig/.  
55 See Richard J. Kilroy, Jr., ed. Threats to Homeland Security: An All-Hazards 
Perspective (Hoboken: J. Wiley and Sons, 2008). 
56 Charles Herman, “Katrina's Economic Impact: One Year Later.” ABC News, August 25, 
2006, available at: 
http://abcnews.go.com/Business/HurricaneKatrina/story?id=2348619&page=1.  
57 Personal conversations of one of the authors with Canadian military personnel. 
58 Vicente Fox, “President Fox Sends New Message about Disaster Caused by Hurricane 
Katrina,” Presidency of the Republic, (September 5, 2005), available at: 
http://fox.presidencia.gob.mx/en/activities/speeches/?contenido=20654&pagina=1. 
Yet, despite Mexico’s willingness to provide support, it was much more difficult to 
coordinate the actual movement of Mexican military personnel and equipment into the 
United States, than it was to accommodate Canada’s efforts. For example, Mexican 
military medical personnel were initially not given permission to provide medical 
support, as well as food products brought into the United States to be used by Mexican 
military field feeding teams were not cleared through customs (Personal conversations of 
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When the Three Amigos met in Guadalajara, Mexico in 2009, each country 
had new elected leaders Felipe Calderon (Mexico), Stephen Harper (Canada), 
and Barack Obama (United States). As a result, the original five agenda items 
of the SPP changed to three:  
 
1. Common Prosperity: Increase trade not restrict it; Legal migration; 
Clean energy  
2. Common Safety and Security: H1N1 cooperation; Defeat drug 
cartels; Control flow of arms 
3. Common Values: Peace; Democracy; Human rights.59 
 
Mexico’s drug wars and the rise of criminal gang violence dominated the 
security dimension of the meeting. The United States wanted Mexico’s 
support in providing more stringent drug trafficking measures to reduce the 
flow of drugs into the United States. Mexico wanted the United States to stem 
the flow of arms into Mexico. Canada was also experiencing the effects of the 
growing problem of transnational crime in the hemisphere. Despite the 
Obama administration’s continued support for the Merida Initiative, begun 
by George W. Bush, there was a pessimistic tone to the meeting.60 The 
positive results of trilateral security cooperation fostered by the events 
surrounding Hurricane Katrina had given way to a more harsh reality that 
each country faced its own problems that could best be resolved internally or 
at a minimum, bilaterally. Thus, in 2010, the North American Leaders’ 
Summit was cancelled. Instead, Prime Minister Harper and President Obama 
met in 2011 and agreed to a new bilateral security policy titled, “Beyond the 
Border,” focusing on security and economic cooperation between Canada and 
the United States.61 This bilateral agreement signaled that the Security and 
                                                          
one of the authors with US NORTHCOM personnel responsible for coordinating with 
Mexican military units). 
59 White House, “Joint Statement by North American Leaders,” Guadalajara, Mexico, 
(August 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Joint-
statement-by-North-American-leaders/.  
60 The Merida Initiative was a US $1.5 billion support package to Mexico over three years, 
to fight the growing threat of drug trafficking organizations. Critics of the program called 
it Plan Mexico, a reference to US. Plan Colombia counterdrug policy in Colombia, which 
involved a direct US military intervention. 
61 Border Action Plan, “Beyond the Border: A Shared Vision for Perimeter Security and 
Economic Competitiveness,” Government of Canada, (February 4, 2011), available at: 
http://www.borderactionplan-plandactionfrontalier.gc.ca/psec-scep/declaration-
declaration.aspx?lang=eng.  
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Prosperity Partnership, begun in 2005, was dead, although members of the 
Mexican Foreign Service argued that there was never a funeral.62 
 
The Merida Initiative and Military Cooperation 
The United States and Mexico continued to develop stronger security ties, 
funneling Merida Initiative funding primarily toward improved Mexican 
military capabilities, to include enhanced intelligence sharing between the 
two countries, coordinated out of the US Embassy in Mexico City. However, 
as Mexico’s military took a more visible role in combating drug trafficking 
organizations, so too did the human rights record of the military come under 
greater scrutiny. United States military leaders had been warned about the 
possible danger of drawing closer to the Mexican military, not only due to the 
historical antagonism that existed between the two countries, but also due to 
the extent that the Mexican military had its own problems with corruption 
and ties to drug trafficking.63 Despite such warnings the US military, under 
US Northern Command’s leadership, engaged in a number of direct and 
indirect support missions to help train and equip the Mexican military to 
combat drug trafficking organizations, to include intelligence sharing. The 
Mexican military, primarily the Marines, have had the most success in 
capturing or killing key leaders of Mexico’s drug cartels, to include the head of 
the Sinaloa Cartel, Joaquín (El Chapo) Guzmán Loera.64 However, whatever 
success the military achieved in combating the drug cartels, was offset by the 
negative publicity surrounding the human rights violations perpetrated 
primarily by the Mexican Army and Federal Police Forces. The most 
egregious case remains unresolved, where 43 college students in Ayotzinapa 
died in 2014, reportedly murdered by drug cartels. Yet, evidence implicates a 
government cover-up and Mexican security forces complicity in the crime.65 
                                                          
62 Personal observations based on interviews conducted by one of the authors with 
Mexican foreign service members. 
63 As one example, in 1995, President Clinton tapped the Commander of US Southern 
Command, General Barry McCaffrey, to become his new Director of the Office of National 
Drug Control Policy (ONDCP). McCaffrey travelled with Secretary of Defense, and 
William Perry to meet with Mexican counterparts, to include Mexico’s drug czar, General 
Jose Gutierrez Rebollo. Despite a briefing by his staff on corruption and collusion of the 
Mexican military with drug trafficking, General McCaffrey called General Rebollo 
“someone he could do business with.” Less than a year after than meeting, General 
Rebollo was arrested on drug trafficking charges (Direct personal involvement of one of 
the authors with General McCaffrey and his staff at US Southern Command). 
64Azam Ahmed, “How El Chapo Was Finally Captured, Again.” New York Times, January 
16, 2016, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/17/world/americas/mexico-
el-chapo-sinaloa-sean-penn.html?_r=0.  
65 Ed Vulliamy, “One Year Ago, 43 Mexican Students Were Killed. Still, There are no 
Answers for Their Families.” The Guardian, September 19, 2015, available at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/20/mexico-43-killed-students-; See 
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The movement from a trilateral framework for security cooperation in North 
America to a series of bilateral relationships, in and of itself, would not 
necessarily discredit the application of RSCT. The sectoral analysis offered by 
Buzan and Waever still has explanatory value in understanding how the 
process of securitization can take place in different spheres of influence. For 
example, the environmental security cooperation that took place between 
Canada, Mexico, and the United States during Hurricane Katrina in 2005 was 
also evident in 2009, when the swine flu pandemic affected Mexico. There 
was a high level of communication and cooperation between health 
organizations in efforts to control and contain the spread of the disease.66 Yet, 
the other variables of Identity, Interests, and Institutions do take on increased 
significance in understanding the limitations of RCST in understanding the 
changes that have taken place more recently in North America, particularly in 
the political and social sectors. Also, these variables can help explain the 
security inequalities, which continue to shape relations between states, 
particularly within specific geographic regions, such as North America, to 
include its geographic and environmental context, for example, shared 
airspace, oceans, borders, proximity, and threats).  
 
New Dynamics in Security Relations in North America and 
RSCT 
On June 29, 2016, the Three Amigos met once again, this time in Ottawa, 
Canada, at the North American Leader’s Summit, to discuss ways in which the 
three countries can increase cooperation on issues of interest to the three 
countries. Concerning Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde’s sectoral analysis, the 
economic sector dominated the discussions, as noted in a statement prior to 
the meeting by Prime Minister Justin Trudeau of Canada,  
 
“I look forward to meeting with President Obama and President Peña 
Nieto to make real progress on the challenges we collectively face—
whether how we can expand trade between our nations, build 
                                                          
also  Fernando Camacho y César Arellano, “Ante ‘falta de resultados’, padres de los 43 
realizanplantónindefinido en la PGR,” La Jornada,April 4, 2017, available at: 
http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2017/04/21/politica/005n1pol.  
66 Information presented by panelists from the United States, Canada, and Mexico during 
a panel titled, “Public Safety and Health Cooperation,” at a conference titled, Trilateral 
Security in North America: New Dimensions and Approaches, Woodrow Wilson 
International Center for Scholars, Washington, DC (March 12, 2010). 
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competitive clean growth economies, or create real help for middle-
class families.”67  
 
At the Summit the three leaders agreed to pursue “economic competitiveness; 
expand our efforts on climate change, clean energy, and the environment; 
solidify our regional and global cooperation; and strengthen our security and 
defense.”68 Much of the focus by President Obama was on gaining support for 
his climate change and environmental initiatives, particularly focused on 
clean energy. One of the few tangible agreements reached at the Summit was 
an Action Plan to promote this agenda.69  
 
Security was included at the Summit, with topics on the agenda, such as: 
Central American violence, corruption, and migration; drug, arms, and 
human trafficking; trusted traveler and border security; health security; and 
regional concerns such as supporting the peace process in Colombia and 
peacekeeping efforts in Haiti. Another security concern on the agenda, which 
crossed multiple sectors, was cooperation in cyberspace. This was particularly 
evident in the discussions regarding energy security and the recognition that 
all three countries’ growing interconnectivity with the North American power 
grid posed an area of increased vulnerability to all three countries. As stated 
in the Action Plan, “Our three countries are committed to deepened electric 
reliability cooperation to strengthen the security and resilience of an 
increasingly integrated North American electricity grid against the growing 
threats presented by cyber-attacks and severe weather events.”70 
 
Although Action Plans, and other shared agendas which come out meetings 
such as the North American Leader’s Summit rarely produce concrete policy 
decisions or institutional structures, the fact that the Summit did take place 
was, in itself, a significant event given some of the contentious issues 
impacting the three countries. Canada was scheduled to host the meeting in 
2015; however, it was cancelled due to a contentious issue over Canadian visa 
                                                          
67 Prime Minister of Canada, “North American Leaders to Meet in Ottawa in June 2016,” 
May 4, 2016, available at: http://pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2016/05/04/north-american-
leaders-meet-ottawa-june-2016.  
68 White House, “FACT SHEET: United States Key Deliverables for the 2016 North 
American Leaders’ Summit,” news release, June 19, 2016, available at: 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/06/29/fact-sheet-united-states-
key-deliverables-2016-north-american-leaders.  
69 White House, “North American Climate, Clean Energy, and Environment Partnership 
Action Plan,” news release, June 19, 2016, available at: 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/06/29/north-american-climate-
clean-energy-and-environment-partnership-action.  
70 White House, “North American Climate.”  
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requirements for Mexican travelers (due to the high number of Mexicans 
arriving in Canada requesting refugee status), as well as a fallout between 
Canada and the United States over the failed Keystone XL Pipeline contract.71 
With the change in leadership in Canada from the conservative party of 
Stephen Harper, to the liberal party of Justin Trudeau, Canada was seeking to 
reengage with both the United States and Mexico in a trilateral forum to 
discuss shared North American issues, but not to recreate the Security and 
Prosperity Partnership. Trudeau made it clear during a visit to Washington, 
D.C. in March 2016 that he viewed the U.S.-Canadian security relationship as 
a special bilateral alliance, which allowed for increased cooperation on border 
security and intelligence sharing.72 This position echoes earlier sentiments 
voiced by Canadian military personnel who did not want to water down the 
unique Canadian-United States security relationship in order to bring Mexico 
into the NORAD structure or even the 5-eyes intelligence partnership.73 
 
                                                          
71 From 2005 until 2008, the number of Mexican citizens traveling to Canada and 
requesting refugee status has tripled, from 3,400 to over 9,400. Citizenship and 
Immigration Canada (2009), “Backgrounder–The Visa Requirement for Mexico,” 
available at: 
http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/department/media/backgrounders/2009/2009-07-13.asp. 
The Keystone XL Pipeline was a proposed oil pipeline that would allow Canadian oil to 
transit the United States to oil refining sites in Texas along the Gulf Coast. Environmental 
groups opposed it and the proposed legislation authorizing the agreement was eventually 
vetoed by President Obama. Coral Davenport, “Citing Climate Change, President Obama 
Rejects Keystone XL Pipeline,” New York Times, November 6, 2015, available at: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/07/us/obama-expected-to-reject-construction-of-
keystone-xl-oil-pipeline.html?_r=0.  
72 John Paul Tasker and Rosemary Barton, “Trudeau, Obama to Announce Expansion of 
Border Pre-Clearance Program,” CBC News, March 9, 2016, available at: 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/trudeau-obama-preclearance-1.3484339.  
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as an equal partner (Personal conversations of one of the authors with Canadian military 
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The US Presidential Election and Identity Politics 
As special, as the Canada–US relationship is the election of Donald Trump as 
President of the United States in November 2016 has ruffled more than a few 
feathers in the bilateral cap. Anti-immigration rhetoric in the United States 
has resulted in a flow of migrants north bound into Canada never seen before. 
Migrants arriving at the border have told officials that fear of being deported 
from the United States has motivated them to make the trek, in some cases in 
dangerous winter conditions, to Canada.74 On the economic front challenges 
to the Canadian softwood, lumber industry has recently resulted in a 
substantial increase on tariffs on softwood lumber crossing from Canada to 
the United States.75 As well, a challenge launched by Boeing against Canadian 
plane manufacturer Bombardier will likely result in a change the way business 
is done in that sector.76 At the same time, Prime Minister Trudeau clearly 
stated his position that he will defend Canadian interests first.  
 
Finally, in a major speech on June 6, 2017, Chrystia Freeland, Canada’s 
Minister of Foreign Affairs roundly rejected the nationalistic view touted 
south of the Canadian border. In its stead, she stated that Canada would 
assume a major leadership role in the world.77 Canada’s commitment to 
assume command of NATO troops in Latvia is one such example of Canada’s 
new global role.  
 
Prior to Mexican president Enrique Peña Nieto’s arrival in Canada, there was 
still some residual effects of the Edward Snowden revelations, regarding the 
National Security Agency’s intelligence collection programs, which targeted 
world leaders, to include the Mexican president.78 When these reports first 
surfaced in 2013, it led to a breakdown in trust between Mexican and US 
intelligence agencies, which had been cooperating on counterdrug operations. 
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Because of the Merida Initiative begun under the George W. Bush and Felipe 
Calderón administrations, intelligence fusion centers had been set up in 
Mexico, to include the US Embassy in Mexico City, as an unprecedented 
means by which Mexican and US intelligence agencies could share 
information to target Mexican drug kingpins, like Joaquín Guzmán Loera.79 
United States intelligence and security cooperation with Mexico included the 
presence of U.S.-piloted drones and military advisors in Mexico, providing 
intelligence support to Mexican military and law enforcement agencies 
targeting Mexican drug cartels. When Peña Nieto came into power in Mexico 
in 2012, and his new national security team learned of the extent of the 
United States presence in Mexico, the new Mexican administration scaled 
back its cooperation with US intelligence agencies, taking a more traditional 
hardline in United States-Mexican security relations.80 They also cancelled 
seminars at the trilateral level and excluded personal and academic exchanges 
between Mexican academics who had relationships with US government 
officials. The Mexican government also went so far as to further restrict 
intelligence sharing between the militaries of the two countries, limiting 
intelligence cooperation to only those agreements exclusively under control of 
the Secretary of the Interior (Gobernación). Despite these official statements 
coming from the Mexican government, the actual military-to-military contact 
between Mexico and the United States actually became stronger under Peña 
Nieto. Thus, the security cooperation transformed. It was not cancelled. 
 
A small expression of amity between Mexico and the United States occurred 
after the second escape of Joaquín Guzmán Loera from Mexican prisons in 
2015. The United States had been pushing for Guzmán’s extradition to stand 
trial in the United States, rather than Mexico, due to corruption of Mexico’s 
judicial system, ever since his capture in 2014 (with the help of US 
intelligence support). President Peña Nieto appeared more open to the 
possibility of extraditing Guzmán to the United States to stand trial after his 
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recapture in January 2016, as long as the United States would ensure he 
would not receive the death penalty.81 
 
Despite the success of the kingpin strategy in Mexico and United States 
support in helping Mexico capture the leaders of most of Mexico’s most 
powerful drug cartels, there is no evidence that drug trafficking to the United 
States has decreased, or that the security situation in Mexican has improved. 
In fact, some evidence points to an increase in drug-related violence and 
homicides in Mexico since Peña Nieto’s administration came to power in 
2012.82 Sources in Mexico state that the number of assassinations per day has 
increased to 57, a 300 per cent increase since 2012.83 Mexico continues to 
insist that drug-related violence is simply a matter of supply and demand, and 
until the United States does something to curb the demand for drugs, there is 
little Mexico can do to decrease the supply.84 This has led former Mexican 
president Vicente Fox to come out in favor of decriminalizing drug use in 
Mexico, which he feels would help end the drug war and violence.85 Although 
individual states in the United States have legalized marijuana, there is no 
national consensus to change the nation’s current counterdrug policies and 
legalize drug use. 
 
The latest enmity to emerge in U.S.-Mexican relations has come from the 
November 2016 presidential election of Republican nominee Donald Trump, 
who used the politics of identity to target undocumented immigration and the 
insecurity of the U.S.-Mexican border. Threatening to “build a great wall 
along the southern border….And Mexico will pay for the wall,” Trump’s 
campaign elevated hostility toward Mexico and Mexican immigrants living in 
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the United States (both documented and undocumented) throughout the 
campaign. Since his election, Trump still views Mexico as a security threat to 
the United States, making such pronouncements that the United States 
should have invaded Mexico in 2003, rather than Iraq.86 In 2016, Mexican 
president Peña Nieto responded to the possibility of a Trump presidency as a 
serious threat to Mexico, having a damaging effect on U.S.-Mexican 
relations.87 In addition to immigration, Trump’s campaign rhetoric also 
targeted U.S.-Mexican economic relations, particularly noting NAFTA, 
blaming Democratic nominee Hillary Clinton’s husband, former President 
Bill Clinton who Trump says, “signed NAFTA, which destroyed this country 
economically, I will tell you. You look at New York state (sic), you look all over 
New England, you look at Pennsylvania, NAFTA was a disaster, (sic) her 
husband signed it. And it was a disaster for this country.”88 
 
While, for Mexico, Trump is the national security threat and his 
administration is informing Mexico that he wants to end up with a new vision 
of North America. Trump also has revived an old Mexican nationalism and 
has challenged so dramatically the national conscience and identity in terms 
of its interdependent relationship at least since the end of the Mexican-
America War of 1847. Today more than ever before, the Mexican Armed 
Forces, particularly the Army, is more nationalistic and more concerned over 
United States intentions toward Mexico.  
 
On July 20, 2016, after the Ottawa Summit, President Obama and President 
Peña Nieto met for bilateral talks in Washington, DC. The focus of their 
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meeting was to try to diffuse the negative rhetoric coming from the Trump 
campaign toward Mexico, and emphasize the importance of the bilateral ties 
between the two nations, particularly with regard to economic cooperation. 
One area highlighted in the meeting was the High Level Economic Dialog 
(HLED) established in 2013, where cabinet-level officials of each country have 
been meeting regularly to discuss ways to increase economic integration 
between the two countries.89 Both Obama and Peña Nieto wanted the HLED 
to continue after January 20, 2017, when the expected new Democratic US 
president, Hillary Clinton, assumed office. She was part of that dialog as 
Secretary of State and would likely continue the HLED under her term.  
 
Since Donald Trump’s inauguration in January 2017, there have been no 
further HLED discussions. In fact, President Peña Nieto cancelled a state visit 
to the United States scheduled for February due to the continued rift over 
Trump’s promise to build a border wall and have Mexico pay for it.90 The 
Trump administration continues to insist on renegotiating NAFTA with both 
Canada and Mexico, to correct the perceived unfair trade practices which 
Trump claims make the United States the big loser in the North American 
trade relationship.91 
 
In reaction to Trump’s rhetoric, the debates have been dramatic: from 
confrontation to silence. For example, former leftist presidential candidate, 
Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas has raised centuries-old claims of a recuperation of 
Texas, California, Arizona, and New Mexico. Jorge G. Castañeda, former 
Minister of Foreign Relations, has argued that Mexico should finish its 
cooperation with the United States on confronting drug cartels, border 
security, and terrorism. While Mexican government officials and President 
Peña Nieto remain quiet and extremely cautious about the new White House, 
Mexico is experiencing three major challenges internally: a week presidency; 
extreme violence related to organized crime; and much uncertain about the 
country’s relationship with the United States under Trump’s administration. 
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Conclusion 
The terrorist attacks of 9/11 created the conditions upon which the nations of 
North America (Canada, Mexico, and the United States) appeared to be 
building a North American security complex by creating institutions, sharing 
interests, and overcoming identity issues, which divided the three countries. 
It was the insecurity of the dominant regional power, the United States, which 
fostered an increased dialog and engagement that went beyond traditional 
security issues to include social, economic, political, and environmental 
concerns. The process of securitization across these various sectors, described 
by Buzan and Waever in Regional Security Complex Theory, provided an 
explanatory value in understanding how these three countries could develop 
institutions, based on shared interests to face the security threats posed in a 
post 9/11 world. Even those barriers formed by identity, which had 
traditionally extended beyond borders which created enmity between states, 
appeared to be weakening. The region appeared to be closer to living out what 
Robert Pastor called “The North American Idea,” where he envisioned a 
constructed future for the region with a new continental identity.92 That 
argument today appears almost dead or at least on life support. 
 
Today, there is a retrenchment of interests along national lines, where the 
countries pursue security relations either unilaterally or at best bilaterally in 
North America. Venues (like the North American Leaders Summits) which 
previously offered opportunities for trilateral engagement on security issues 
no longer carry a sense of urgency or even promise for any substantive change 
in cooperation in any sector, even economic cooperation.93 United States 
President Donald Trump has elevated the politics of identity to new levels in 
the United States with his populist rhetoric, which continues after the election 
campaign. His relationship with a Republican-controlled Congress is tenuous 
at best and his administration continues to face both Congressional and 
independent inquiries into its relationship with Russian officials before the 
election. While some members of Congress have gone so far as to call for 
Trump impeachment, at a minimum the allegations of wrongdoing will 
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continue to affect the legitimacy and credibility of the American presidency.94 
Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto faces his own domestic political crises, 
which also limit his ability to propose any new security initiatives in the last 
year of his administration. Only Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau 
appears to have any real political stake in the outcome of a new North 
American Leaders Summit, which he could parley into some domestic 
advantage, particularly on economic or energy policies. 
 
While Regional Security Complex Theory argues that among the members of 
a Security Complex a group of countries or just two neighbor countries can 
develop converge toward threats or divergence like in the case of North and 
South Korea. In North America, what initially appeared to be a convergence of 
interests, particularly with regard to security and threats after 9/11, now 
appears to be diverging due to the role of identity politics. The questions are 
for how long, is it a permanent trend, or is it just the beginning of a new era in 
North American relationships? 
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